The measurement of inter-industry pay differentials and the resulting use of this information to assess the empirical relevance of different labor market theories have been hampered by the fact that measures of total compensation -as opposed to just wages and salaries -are not available in the datasets traditionally used. We improve upon past measures of inter-industry pay differentials by being the first, to our knowledge, to incorporate microdata on nonwage compensation. Such compensation can easily exceed 40 to 50 percent of wages and thus its inclusion may either diminish or amplify measured industry pay differences. Using the Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) data produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, we find that the inclusion of benefits increases industry dispersion by 16 percent when no controls are included and by an even greater 30 percent when controls are included.
Introduction
Are equivalent workers doing similar work paid more in some industries than in others? This question has been an important one in labor economics for many decades. Slichter [17] was among the first to address it, noting the differing wage rates for unskilled laborers in manufacturing industries. In the 1980s, spurred in part by the increasing availability of microdata that enabled controls for individual characteristics, there was a revival of interest in this area [2, 3, 11, 12] . Though the expanding availability of employer-employee matched databases has helped shift focus away from industry and towards individual employers [1] , work in this area continues [4, 6, 7] .
It is well known that large inter-industry wage differentials remain even after attempts have been made to control for a wide array of individual characteristics.
Groshen [8] offers a taxonomy for models seeking to explain this finding. Such differentials may arise because: 1) employers sort workers by ability; 2) compensating differentials lead to a variation of wages across industries; 3) there are random variations in pay, perhaps generated or perpetuated by costly information; 4) firms may pay efficiency wages to increase effort, reduce turnover and improve worker morale; and 5) there may be rent sharing. Distinguishing among these competing theories is important because they have different implications for policies in a number of different areas, including foreign trade, unemployment insurance and industrial policy. In addition, variation in wages by industry and, more generally, by employer are important for understanding the distribution of pay, given their impact on the overall distribution and their implications for understanding and addressing differences in pay by demographic group.
The measurement of inter-industry pay differentials and the resulting use of this information both to assess the empirical relevance of different labor market theories and to understand patterns in the distribution of pay have been hampered by the fact that measures of total compensation -as opposed to just wages and salariesare not available in the datasets traditionally used by labor economists, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the U.S. To our knowledge, we are the first to use compensation microdata in a study of inter-industry pay differentials. Compensation is clearly preferable to wages, given that it measures the actual willingness to pay on the demand side by companies and is what, in competitive labor market models, is being equated to the value of marginal product. Almost without exception, studies prior to this one have used wages and salaries to measure pay, thus omitting an important and growing portion of compensation, noncash benefits. Because nonwage compensation can sometimes exceed 40 to 50 percent of wages, its inclusion has the potential to alter the industry differences noted.
It is possible, for instance, that inter-industry differences are overstated by wages and that including benefits would diminish such differences. For example, health insurance and legally required employer costs like unemployment insurance can have fixed cost attributes that reduce measured percentage differentials across groups of workers. Or, tradeoffs between wage and nonwage forms of compensation could manifest along industry lines. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons to think that the exclusion of noncash compensation has led to an understatement of inter-industry differences. For a variety of reasons, higher benefits tend to go with higher wages. First, some benefits -for example, health insurance and defined contribution pensions -are tax-advantaged in the U.S., making them relatively cheaper for workers with higher marginal tax rates. Second, demands for benefits tend to be very income-elastic [20] . Third, higher-wage individuals tend to have other characteristics such as being older or being married that correlate with greater demand for benefits.
To determine the direction of this effect, this study makes use of a dataset that contains both wage and nonwage compensation, the Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) data produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (US-BLS). We find that the inclusion of benefits increases industry dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation of inter-industry differentials, by 16 percent when no controls are included and by an even greater 30 percent when controls are included.
Data
The ECEC data used here form part of the National Compensation Survey (NCS) program of the USBLS. The NCS program houses a unique array of data. It is an establishment survey designed to yield comprehensive measures of compensation levels and trends, and of the incidence and characteristics of employer-provided benefits plans. The main strength of the survey is that it provides information on employerprovided benefit plans and costs, in conjunction with other data elements, at the level of the job. Our application, which requires good measures for industry and compensation, along with productivity controls at the job level, plays to this strength.
The NCS surveys workers in private industry establishments, and in State and local government, in the 50 States and the District of Columbia. Major exclusions from the survey are workers in Federal and quasi-Federal agencies, military personnel, agricultural workers, workers in private households, the self-employed, volunteers, unpaid workers, individuals receiving long-term disability compensation, individuals working overseas, individuals who set their own pay (for example, proprietors, owners, major stockholders, and partners in unincorporated firms) and family members being paid token wages [18] .
ECEC data are collected from probability samples selected in three stages: (1) a probability sample of geographic areas, (2) a probability sample of establishments within sampled areas, and (3) a probability sample of jobs within sampled establishments. In the first stage, certainty areas are determined and non-certainty areas are selected with probability proportionate to size. In the second stage, establishments within each area are chosen, also with probability proportionate to size. 1, 2 Finally, in the third stage, within each establishment, a number of jobs are sampled, with the selection probabilities being proportionate to employment in the job. The number of jobs selected generally ranges from 4 to 8 depending on establishment size.
The typical method of selecting a single job is as follows: Employers will provide a list of all employees, which is refined to correctly reflect the NCS scope, and then an 1 The sampling frame, or universe, of establishments from which the NCS samples are drawn is derived from state unemployment insurance reports. The frame allows the NCS to start out with robust information on establishment characteristics such as employment, industry and location.
2 The NCS uses a panel structure to rotate establishments into the survey. To keep the sample current and reduce respondent burden, about one-fifth of the private industry sample is reselected each year, and newly selected private industry panels stay in the survey for five years. For details on the NCS panel structure and the resulting implications for weights construction, see [18] . algorithm selects an individual at random. The job the individual has is then defined using the employer's most narrow occupational classification. The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code will be determined, along with whether the job is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, is full-time or part-time, and whether its pay is tied, at least in part, to commissions, piece rates, production bonuses, or other incentives based on production or sales. Job duties, discussed further below, and the job's usual work schedule are also determined. Data are then collected for all workers in a job with these same characteristics as the sampled job. The number of workers in a job ranges from one, when a unique position has been chosen, to as high as in the thousands.
One major use to which NCS data are put is to enable the U.S. President's Pay Agent -which consists of the Secretary of Labor and the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management -to compare rates of pay under the General Schedule (GS) to non-Federal rates of pay. As a step in doing so, the NCS collects information on job duties. We use these data elements (or "factors") describing job duties, each of which is an ordinal variable with a number of possible levels, as proxies for skill in our analysis below. As a practical matter, much of the explanatory power of these data keys off of the Knowledge factor, which is meant to capture skills related to schooling, training, and experience. Guidelines captures the extent to which policies and rules direct the job tasks. Complexity describes the intricacy of tasks. Scope and Effect describes the importance of the job to the organization as a whole. Supervision Received captures how directed the job is. The Personal Contacts and Purpose of Contacts variables capture the amount and importance of interpersonal communications that are not in the supervisory chain. The variables collected in this process have been shown to be of great use in controlling for skill differences across jobs [7] . 3 Earnings data are collected and converted into average hourly wage rates using work schedule information common to all workers in the sampled job. In the ECEC, earnings are defined to include incentive pay but exclude premium pay for overtime, holiday, and weekend work; shift differentials; bonuses not directly tied to production; payments by third parties such as tips; and payment in kind such as room and board. The ECEC also measures the following types of benefits: paid leavevacations, holidays, sick leave, and personal leave; supplemental pay -premium pay for work in addition to the regular work schedule (such as overtime, weekend, and holiday work) and for shift differentials, and nonproduction bonuses (such as yearend, referral, and attendance bonuses); insurance benefits -life, health, shortterm disability, and long-term disability insurance; retirement and savings benefitsdefined benefit and defined contribution plans; and legally required benefits -Social Security, Medicare, Federal and State unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation. Each component of the ECEC data is collected and converted to a cost per hour worked, and then averaged over the incumbents within a job. These averages are then summed over all the nonwage components to form a measure of nonwage compensation and then added to the hourly wage rate to obtain a measure of total compensation.
As is detailed in [16] , there are caveats to be kept in mind when considering these data. First, as the name implies, the data refer to employer costs, which will differ from employee valuations due to a number of considerations including taxes, the fact that the same benefits are being provided to a large group, and to any divergence between an employer's price for a benefit and what an employee would have to pay as an individual [5] . Second, there is a certain amount of measurement error involved in getting job-specific data for some of the components of the ECEC because respondents are sometimes able to report data only for a broader group than the job incumbents, such as the average for all white-collar workers or for all workers.
Nonetheless, we believe the ECEC to be the best compensation microdata that are available in the U.S. They come from a representative sample, comprehensively cover the benefit spectrum and are derived from employer and administrative records. As the industry reports come from the employer and not from descriptions of an employee or his/her proxy, they are apt to be more accurate than those from a household survey. In addition, occupation, which we use as a regression control, is likely to be less error ridden as well [13, 14] . While we do not have demographic information, we have high-quality job content information, which, along with other information about the job and the establishment, enable a comparison of jobs across industries. 4 In contrast to the case of the microdata traditionally used in inter-industry wage analysis, the unit of analysis is a job rather than an individual. When weighted, however, the data represent the average worker and not the average job. Though ECEC data have not been used previously for an analysis of inter-industry pay differences, they have been used in more general studies of compensation inequality [15, 16] . In addition, as noted, the ECEC is part of the NCS program of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and wage data from the NCS have been used together with data from the CPS in a study of inter-industry wage differentials [7] .
Prior literature
While the literature on inter-industry wage differentials is vast, articles on interindustry compensation differentials are scarce. Two studies have tried to circumvent the lack of availability of nonwage compensation data by linking CPS hourly wage data with data on total compensation from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Krueger and Summers [12] multiplied hourly wages in the May 1984 CPS by the ratio of compensation to wages in NIPA for the corresponding industry. They found that including nonwage compensation tends to increase rather than reduce cross-industry differentials. In a similar exercise with the same NIPA data, Katz and Summers [10] also find that consideration of fringe benefits expands inter-industry differences. While these results are suggestive, the assumption that benefits as a share of compensation do not vary within industry need not hold. For example, Pierce [16] has shown that the share of compensation devoted to benefits tends to increase as compensation rises. Given this and other reasons for withinindustry variation in compensation, it seems that compensation microdata would allow for more accurate inter-industry differential estimation. Another motivation for the present study is that the aforementioned results used data from more than 25 years ago, when benefits composed a smaller share of total compensation.
Results
Before turning to our main results, we present some descriptive statistics on wages and four groups of benefits: health insurance, retirement and savings, paid leave and a catch-all category for the remainder. 5 As shown in Table 1 , wages in the 2009 ECEC averaged $20.81 per hour, or 69.3 percent of total compensation, for the economy as a whole. Benefits averaged $9.23 per hour, or 30.7 percent of total compensation, with the most important categories being health (8.2 percent), leave (7.1 percent) and retirement (4.4 percent). Table 2 provides further detail on wages and benefits, showing similar information as in Table 1 , except that it is arrayed by industry. A glance at this table suggests that benefit costs are non-negligible components of compensation, with substantial variation across industry. Those industries with high wages also tend to have high benefits, but the rank across all the columns is not identical. That impression is confirmed by the matrix of correlation coefficients, shown in Table 3 . The cross-industry correlation of wages with the four benefit categories ranges from 0.750 for retirement and to 0.897 for paid leave. Retirement and health insurance costs are more highly correlated than are either alone with wages. While these correlations are high, it is clear that the ratio of compensation to wages varies by industry, so that including nonwage compensation affects inter-industry differentials.
To see by how much, we now turn to inter-industry analysis. We employ a series of regressions of the form Notes. The final row gives the weighted standard deviation of industry wage premia, where weights are proportionate to total hours worked in the industry. The standard deviations are corrected for sampling error in the premia estimates; their standard errors are shown in parentheses [9] . Controls are the job content variables, ln(establishment employment), and indicators for full-time status, union status, incentive pay, two-digit occupation, Census division, and presence in a metropolitan area.
where Y is either the log hourly wage or the log hourly compensation, Z is a set of indicator variables representing 47 industries, and X is a set of other covariates. There are two regressions for each dependent variable. First, X is only a constant, allowing for the measurement of raw differentials. Second, to assess adjusted differentials, we include a series of variables measuring job duties or content, the log of establishment employment, along with indicators for full-time status, union status, incentive pay, two-digit occupation, Census division, and presence in a metropolitan area.
As shown near the bottom of Table 4 , industry affiliation alone explains a substantial amount of the variation in wages (33 percent) and compensation (38 percent). When other controls are added, the R-squared reaches nearly 0.8, much higher than in comparable regressions using household data. The primary explanation for this is that the job content variables explain much more pay variation than their counterparts in the CPS, education and experience. Additionally, as noted, the NCS probably more accurately measure wages, occupation and industry. Table 4 also displays the industry wage premia in detail. There are two sets of premia for wages and for compensation, one with no controls and one with controls. In all cases, industry premia are log differentials measured relative to the sample average, so weighted averages of the premia equal zero by construction. In addition to the detailed industry premia, the table displays as summary measures the weighted standard deviations of the industry premia, in the final row. Because sampling variation in the coefficient estimates artificially inflates the standard deviation measure, we make an adjustment as in [9] .
In the first column, the raw industry wage differentials range from a high of 0.583 log points for Internet service providers and data processing services to a low of −0.811 log points for Food services and drinking places, with a standard deviation of 0.341. When controls are added, industry differentials shrink greatly -all raw industry differentials above 0.10 in absolute value shrink toward zero -with the standard deviation declining by 69 percent. Despite the narrowing of the differentials, industries that were high-paying before controls are added tend to be high-paying Notes. The final row gives the weighted standard deviation of industry wage premia, where weights are proportionate to total hours worked in the industry. The standard deviations are corrected for sampling error in the premia estimates; their standard errors are shown in parentheses [9] . Controls are for five education groups, a quartic in experience, full-time status, union status, two-digit occupation, Census division, and presence in a metropolitan area.
afterwards, as the hours-weighted employment correlation between the two sets of wage differentials is 0.84. Before turning to the main focus of the paper, inter-industry compensation differentials, it is useful to compare the inter-industry wage differentials from the ECEC to those from the more familiar Current Population Survey (CPS), shown in Table 5. Both sets of wage differentials, with and without controls, are highly correlated with their counterpart in the other dataset. Without controls, the standard deviation is higher for the ECEC, 0.341 to 0.251 in the CPS, owing in part to more accurate industry reporting in establishment surveys. With controls, however, the order is reversed, as the explanatory power of the skill variables in the ECEC leads to a greater narrowing of the standard deviation in that dataset than in the CPS.
We now turn to the measurement of compensation differentials and ask if it is misleading to have wage differentials stand in for compensation differentials. Looking at raw differentials first, we compare column 3 of Table 4 to column 1 in the same table. Some of the differences are quite large. For instance, the raw differential for petroleum and coal products manufacturing widens from 0.576 to 0.723 points when one switches from wages to compensation, while that for Food services and drinking places moves from −0.811 to −0.958 points. Most of the other changes are, however, smaller in absolute value. Even so, for the compensation differentials, we see evidence of increased dispersion, as the standard deviation has risen to 0.394, up 16 percent from that for the raw wage differentials. In other words, rather than offsetting the differentials, the inclusion of compensation has expanded them, with the two sets being very highly correlated (0.99).
How do the compensation differentials look after controlling for skill and other variables? As with the wage differentials, they contract, though not by quite as much (by 65 percent, as measured by the standard deviation). When these adjusted compensation differentials are compared to the wage differentials, however, a different picture emerges. The standard deviation of 0.139 is 30 percent higher than that for wage differentials, confirming that wage differentials do understate the extent of inter-industry differences. While neither Krueger and Summers [12] nor Katz and Summers [10] presented a measure of change for raw dispersion, their increases in dispersion after controls were on the order of 26 and 28 percent, respectively. Thus, the incorporation of benefit costs clearly expands rather than offsets measured inter-industry differentials. This pattern emerges for a variety of possible reasons, including: tax-advantaged benefits are relatively cheaper for workers with higher marginal tax rates; demand for benefits are very income-elastic; and higherwage individuals tend to have other characteristics (such as being older or married) that correlate with greater demand for benefits. These explanations do not require that inter-industry differentials reflect ability differences, only that firm and worker choices regarding wage-benefits packages act to magnify inter-industry pay differences. For example, rent capture by workers could generate greater benefit demand (via income or tax-price effects), or, unionized bargaining environments may stress noncash compensation.
Concluding remarks
The vast literature measuring inter-industry differentials has almost without exception focused on wage premia and excluded nonwage compensation, an important and growing portion of total compensation. The inclusion of fringe benefits has the potential to either offset measured differentials or expand them. We find that the inclusion of compensation increases industry dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation, by 16 percent when no controls are included and by 30 percent when controls are included. An interesting avenue for future research would be to see if this finding holds at other points in time and for other countries.
